Digest of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about trusts and estates, tax assessment, and…
Civil Protection Order Stands
A civil protection order stands if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that respondent committed sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking under one, but not all three, of the statutes enumerated in CGS § 46b-16a(a). The Connecticut Appellate Court reached this conclusion in Kayla M. v. Greene, officially released on February 18, 2016 (the court’s website did not make the Advance Release available until February 22).
Section 46b-16a(a) provides in part that “[a]ny person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking, as described in sections 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e, may make and application to the Superior Court for [a civil protection order] ….” Section 53a-181c is stalking in the first degree; section 53a-181d is stalking in the second degree; and section 53a-181e is stalking in the third degree.
The husband and wife respondents did not contest any of the trial court’s factual findings. From those factual findings, the “[trial] court concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendants had engaged in conduct that constituted the crime of stalking in the second and third degrees and that they would continue to engage in such conduct in the absence of civil protection orders.” The trial court entered protection orders. Respondents appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed.
Respondents’ Arguments on Appeal
Respondents claimed the trial court erred in entering the civil protection orders because (i) no such order could enter unless they committed stalking in the first, second and third degrees, as opposed to just the second and third degrees; and (ii) their conduct did not rise to the level of second or third degree stalking.
Appellate Court Concludes Civil Protection Order Stands
The Appellate Court rejected respondents’ first argument because it would lead to absurd results:
If we were to construe the legislature’s use of the word “and” in the conjunctive, as the defendants argue, the inclusion of § 53a-181d in the statutory language would be rendered meaningless…. If an applicant for a civil protection order on the basis of stalking always had to prove that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had committed stalking in the first, second, and third degrees, this means all applicants would be required to show that they were the victim of stalking in the first degree pursuant to § 53a-181c. The elements necessary to prove stalking in the first degree by definition include the elements of stalking in the second degree…. In other words, a defendant can only be convicted of stalking in the first degree if he or she committed stalking in the second degree. Thus, if the term ‘‘and’’ in § 46b-16a (a) is conjunctive, then the phrase ‘‘as described in sections 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e’’ is synonymous with ‘‘as described in §§ 53a-181c and 53a-181e.’’ Such an interpretation of the term ‘‘and’’ would render the inclusion of § 53a-181d superfluous. Only the construction of ‘‘and’’ in the disjunctive makesthe inclusion of all three stalking statutes logically consistent. Therefore, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of the term ‘‘and’’ in § 46b-16a (a) is in the disjunctive. Accordingly, an applicant for a civil protection order on the basis of stalking is required to prove only that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant stalked and will continue to stalk, as described in §§ 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e.
As to respondents’ second argument, the Appellate Court noted that this was not a criminal proceeding so petitioner was not required to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, § 46b-16a requires only that there be “reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has” violated one of the enumerated statutes. “Reasonable grounds” is probable cause. The Appellate Court went on to apply the facts the trial court found to the elements of the crimes. It concluded that the trial court properly found that there were reasonable grounds to believe respondents’ conduct met each element.