Review of a Connecticut Supreme Court advance release opinion about taxation. Taxation Dish Network, LLC…
Advance Release Opinions – December 26
The Connecticut Supreme Court advance released an opinion about easement by necessity for utilities, which I review below. The Court also advance released an opinion about criminal law, for which I provide the official syllabus, but no review.
Easement by Necessity
Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC – Fancini claimed that his right-of-way also gave him an easement by necessity to install utility lines to service his property. The Supreme Court concluded that there can be an easement by necessity for utilities in Connecticut and provided the standard for determining whether one has been established: “When an easement of physical access already exists, an expansion of that easement will be allowed so long as it is reasonably necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant estate and does not unreasonably impair the servient estate owner’s beneficial enjoyment of his or her property.” In general, “[a]n easement by necessity for utilities should be granted over an existing physical access easement when the dominant estate has a reasonable need for the utility, in accordance with the intention of the parties as to the use of the property, unless the burden interferes with that owner’s beneficial enjoyment of the property…. In the event use of the easement for utilities does impair the enjoyment of the servient estate, the court must then determine whether the need of the dominant estate is so great that the easement should still be granted or if it could be altered so as to limit the burden on the servient estate.”
Criminal Law
State v. Miranda -Syllabus:
“Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. At trial, the victim’s mother was asked, on direct examination by the state, whether she had heard information relating the defendant to the victim’s disappearance. The defendant objected on the basis of relevancy, and the trial court overruled that objection. The victim’s mother responded in the affirmative, and the defendant did not raise any additional objections. Subsequently, another state’s witness, D, testified that he had seen the victim get into a car on the day of her disappearance and that, although he did not see the driver’s face, that person had a light complexion, a mustache, and curly brown or black hair. D then testified that he had relied on guidance from God in identifying the driver in a photographic array presented by the police. The defendant objected, and the jury was excused. Thereafter, the trial court ruled that the testimony regarding the photographic array was inadmissible. The jury returned, and D’s testimony concluded without further discussion of his identification. Subsequently, the trial court, noting its concern that the defendant’s objection was not sustained in the jury’s presence, indicated that D’s improper testimony could be addressed in the jury charge and offered to address the matter prior to the charge if requested. Defense counsel then indicated to the court that he was working on language for an instruction. The trial court subsequently received the defendant’s request to charge and reviewed its proposed instructions with the parties. The trial court ultimately instructed the jury that it had sustained the objection to D’s testimony and that any answer given after that objection should be disregarded. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court incorrectly failed to strike D’s improper testimony. The defendant further claimed that the trial court improperly permitted the victim’s mother to testify that she had heard information relating the defendant to the victim’s disappearance because that testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. Held:
“1. The defendant expressly waived his claim that the trial court incorrectly failed to strike D’s improper testimony; the defendant had approved of the trial court’s proposed remedy for D’s improper testimony by expressing satisfaction with the trial court’s plan to use an instruction, by declining to request action by the trial court before it issued that instruction, and by ultimately approving of the trial court’s proposed instruction.
2. The defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly permitted the victim’s mother to testify that she had heard information relating the defendant to the victim’s disappearance on the ground that it constituted inadmissible hearsay was unpreserved and, accordingly, unreviewable; the defendant objected to that testimony on the basis of relevancy, and, thus, the trial court had no notice or opportunity to consider the issue of hearsay.”
