Digest of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about trusts and estates, tax assessment, and…
Advance Release Opinions – Appellate Court – August 31
Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about divorce, insurance, and worker’s compensation.
Divorce
Merk-Gould v. Gould – Appellate Court reversed alimony award and division of certain investments because trial court’s finding as to defendant’s earning capacity was clearly erroneous and trial court abused its discretion in valuing the investments at acquisition cost, rather than value at date of dissolution. Because the alimony award was interwoven with everything else, the remand requires the trial court to reconsider all financial and property orders.
Insurance
Vaccaro v. D’Angelo – Vaccaro was Boileau’s lawyer in a personal injury action. D’Angelo was Boileau’s chiropractor who had a letter of protection. After the case settled, Boileau disputed whether he had to pay D’Angelo for treatments that exceeded the maximum number under Boileau’s health insurance plan. Boileau said that he didn’t have to pay because the provider contract between D’Angelo and Boileau’s health insurance plan required D’Angelo to obtain Boileau’s acknowledgment of financial responsibility before each extra treatment and D’Angelo did not do that. Vaccaro started an interpleader action. Trial court found for D’Angelo. Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the acknowledgment form was only required for non-covered services, and treatments that exceeded the maximum number were not “non-covered services.” Boileau had some other claims too, but Appellate Court declined to consider them as inadequately briefed.
Worker’s Compensation
Diaz v. Department of Social Services – Dueling doctors on the question of whether lack of proper ergonomics at the workplace, or pre-existing conditions unrelated to the employment, triggered Diaz’s back surgery. Commissioner dismissed. Board affirmed. Appellate Court also affirmed, finding that (1) board was bound to accept commissioner’s decision as to which medical evidence he found more persuasive; (2) board properly affirmed commissioner’s denial of Diaz’s motion to correct his findings because Diaz really just asked the commissioner to substitute her conclusions for his own; and (3) board did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz’s motion to submit additional evidence because that additional evidence was not new.