Advance Release Opinions – June 8

Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about breach of contract, condemnation, professional negligence (legal malpractice), and reformation.

Breach of Contract

Murallo v. United Builders Supply Co., Inc. – Parties testified that they had a telephone conversation in which they reached an agreement resolving a dispute they were having over construction materials. Defendant confirmed the terms in a follow up email. Plaintiff later alleged that defendant refused to honor the agreement. After a courtside trial, trial court concluded that defendant’s email was not a contract but an unaccepted offer, and found for defendant. Appellate Court reversed, finding the unaccepted-offer conclusion clearly erroneous as defendant had admitted that the email memorialized the telephonic agreement.

Condemnation

Gartrell v. Hartford – Not technically condemnation, but close. Doesn’t really matter because the issue was not preserved for appeal, so Appellate Court declined to review it. After a fire at Gantrell’s building, Hartford tore it down. Gantrell sued. Jury trial. After the close of evidence, Hartford moved for a directed verdict. Court reserved decision, pending jury’s answer to a single interrogatory asking whether Hartford could have believed there was an imminent danger allowing it to tear down the building. Jury answered “Yes.” Court then asked parties if they had anything to add to the motion for directed verdict. When they said “No,” court directed verdict for Hartford. On appeal, Gantrell argued that jury’s finding that Hartford could have believed there was imminent danger did not support directed verdict; jury would have had to have found that Hartford did believe there was imminent danger. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that Gantrell failed to preserve the issue for appellate review since he “failed to raise the issue to the trial court on the record, either before or after the jury was charged, or as a basis for denying the city’s motion for a directed verdict.”

Professional Negligence (Legal Malpractice)

Kuehl v. Koskoff – Mr. Kuehl had car accident on his way from his home office to a business meeting. He later discovered an injury that he believed was tied to the car accident. He filed a worker’s comp claim, but the employer and insurer contested whether the accident happened in the scope of employment. Mr. Kuehl signed up with Koskoff to pursue claims against the other driver. Mrs. Kuehl signed up with Koskoff to pursue any claims arising out of the accident. Mr. Kuehl then died, and Koskoff and Mrs. Kuehl believed it was a result of the accident. Mrs. Kuehl missed the deadline for filing a claim for worker’s comp survivor benefits, and the commissioner would not let her proceed. She blamed Koskoff and started a legal malpractice action. Jury found for Mrs. Kuehl. Though there was no expert testimony as to causation, trial court denied Koskoff’s motion to set aside the verdict. Appellate Court reversed, finding that expert testimony was necessary to establish causation, i.e. that it was more likely than not that Mrs. Kuehl would have been awarded survivor’s benefits if she had made her claim on time. Since Mrs. Kuehl failed to present that testimony, trial court should have set aside the verdict.

Reformation

Kaplan v. Scheer – Kaplan has owned her home since 1970. The Scheers became her neighbors in 1999. The Scheers’ house stands between Kaplan’s house and the Long Island Sound. The Scheers have a walkway and stairs that provide access to the water, which Kaplan had a right to use under a water easement granted in an 1882 deed. Kaplan and the Scheers had a contentious relationship and ended up in a dispute about whether Kaplan’s driveway was on the Scheers’ property. They settled that dispute with a written agreement calling for two quitclaim deeds and an easement. One deed, labelled “A” in the settlement agreement, conveyed to the Scheers any interest that Kaplan had in the Scheers’ property. The other deed, labelled “B” in the settlement agreement, conveyed to Kaplan any interest the Scheers had in Kaplan’s property. The easement, labeled “C” in the settlement agreement, gave Kaplan an easement over Scheers’ property – but only as necessary for Scheer to access her property. The documents were recorded in reverse order of their letter designations: Easement first, Scheer-to-Kaplan deed second, and Kaplan-to-Scheer deed third. Sometime after that, the Scheers made their walkway and stairs off limits to Kaplan. Kaplan sued, claiming that (1) the letter designations dictated the recording order, and she would still have her water easement if they had been recorded in that order; and (2) her deed to the Scheers should be reformed to reserve the water easement. Trial court found that (1) the letter designations were a matter of convenience and not intended to specify a recording order (there was also expert testimony that the recording order did not matter); and (2) Kaplan failed to prove a basis for reformation by clear and convincing evidence. Appellate Court affirmed.